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The Political Element in Legal Theory:
A Look at Kelsen's Pure Theory*
Julius Cohent
In the literature of legal theory, considerable attention has been
devoted to debating whether valuational considerations' should be
outside the bounds of legal theory. This controversy appears in the
continuing bouts between natural law theorists and legal positivists.2
The question to be raised in this article is not whether such valua-
tional elements should be excluded from legal theory, but whether
they ever can be kept off-limits. This issue comes into sharp focus
in what is perhaps the most extreme and uncompromising expression
of legal positivism, Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law. For the Pure
' I owe special thanks to Professor Abraham Edel for intellectual nourishment, to
Professor Harold D. Lasswell for encouragement, and to the Guggenheim Foundation
for financial support.
t Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law.
1. The term "valuation" is used here in a broad sense to include desires, aims,
strivings, approvals and disapprovals, purposes, and ideals.
2. The terms "natural law" and "positivism" are often assumed to carry precisely
defined meanings, yet on careful inspection they appear to designate a surprising num-
ber of different approaches and logically distinct doctrines. A variety of positions are
said to be in the "natural law tradition." These range from the notion that there are
ethical principles about rights and duties that inhere in our natural faculties to the
notion that human institutions and laws may be evaluated in light of overarching prin-
ciples. See Frankena, On Defining and Defending Natural Law, in LAIW AND PHILOSOPHY
200-09 (S. Hook ed. 1964) (adherents of natural law refer to laws of the physical sciences,
general norms of conduct, natural standards of conduct, laws known by natural human
faculties, God's commands discerned by human faculties, and other formulations).
The complexity of the label "legal positivism" was the subject of a conference by a
group of distinguished legal theorists. See Falk & Shuman, The Bellagio Conference on
Legal Positivism, 14 J. LEGAL EDuc. 213-28 (1961) (noting multiple historical and con-
temporary uses of label "legal positivism"). For the purposes of this study, the term is
meant to include the work of such theorists as Bentham, Austin, Kelsen, and Hart,
whose focus is on actual rather than ideal legal systems. These theorists have isolated
for study such problems as the meaning and validity of law, its structural elements, and
its conceptual apparatus. They insist that these analytic inquiries he undertaken without
consideration of moral and political implications.
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Theory argues that the "legal" must be distinguished from both the
"moral" and the "factual," and that the description and analysis of
its special autonomous properties must proceed without any valua-
tional accompaniment.
Many critics have attacked the Pure Theory's claim to "purity."1
Often, they try to detect fine cracks in the structure of the theory
in order to expose the particular values lurking within it. These
criticisms, however, leave the impression that the uncovered values
were implanted, either by stealth or inadvertence, and were there-
fore improprieties in the execution of the theory. As a result, these
evaluations of the Pure Theory implicitly honor the claim of value-
free analysis by simply exposing and reporting instances in which it
has fallen short. Other critics of the Pure Theory take it to task for
not paying attention to problems of greater social concern. Yet these
critics also assume that "purity" can be attained by the theory, how-
ever unworthy they consider that goal.4
The purpose of this study is to suggest that the Pure Theory fails
to live up to its claim of value-free analysis not because it occasionally
loses its purity but because valuational elements are unavoidably a
constituent part of its structure. It will be argued that the Pure
Theory does not succeed in constructing a formal skeletal account
of essential characteristics common to all legal orders5 because the
theory reflects particular historical configurations. Kelsen's claim
that his analysis is universal and ahistorical may hide from view the
particular values that inhere in the theory, but it cannot eliminate
them. It will also be argued that the valuational element in the
Pure Theory may be blocked from sight by an inherent defect in
the lens that Kelsen has fashioned for viewing the theory. This dis-
cussion of the Pure Theory is meant to function as an illustration
in the tradition of case-method pedagogy; the conclusions produced
here may serve to heighten our understanding of other positivist
theories.
An examination of the points of entry to the theory-those features
that are readily apparent to one who initially approaches its analytic
constructs-reveals choices made by the theorist from among a range
of competing formulations, definitions, and concepts. These choices
3. One of the most trenchant and unrelenting critiques is contained in J. STONE,
LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYrs' REASONING 98-136 (1964).
4. See p. 5 & notes 12-14 infra.
5. See H. KELSEN, (.E\IRAL THFORY OF LXw AND STATE 19 (A. Wedberg trans. 1945)
(claim that social tedhnique of coerciCe order is common to all legal systems) [hereinafter
cited without cross-reference as GENLRAL THEORY].
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reflect valuations and indicate the political nature of the theory-that
is, the extent to which the theory is shaped, consciously or not, by
attitudes and preferences regarding commitment to and conduct un-
der a legal order. Because the theory in turn shapes attitudes con-
cerning commitment to and conduct under the legal order, it also
has an active political function.
The entry-points to the theory that will be examined are (1) the
stated tasks of the theory; (2) its methodological assumptions; (3) the
meanings ascribed to key terms; (4) the conceptual apparatus; (5)
the role assignments under the theory; and (6) the assumptions con-
cerning the functions of a legal order. Discussion of these entry-points
will lead to consideration of factual assumptions, conceptions of in-
ternational law, and other components of the Pure Theory.
I. The Tasks of the Pure Theory
A theory is defined by the tasks it selects, the problems it addresses,
and the kind of yield it expects. In the tradition of the positive
sciences, the tasks of legal theory as proposed by Kelsen are to secure
and organize knowledge about the existing structure of any legal or-
der in any place or time. Although the Pure Theory differs from
the positive sciences because it addresses a complex of norms, not
facts, the Theory also resembles the sciences because it offers guid-
ance for recognizing a given subject matter, not for directing its
course. The Pure Theory does not seek to provide a method of in-
terpretation for judicial decisionmakers, nor does it intend to guide
the legal order toward some ideal substantive goals.
Instead, Kelsen sets forth these three major tasks: 6 (1) to establish
the distinguishing marks of the "legal" and provide law with an as-
certainable identity, purified of such "alien" elements as "psychology,
sociology, ethics and political theory;"' (2) to establish a method
for validating judgments as "legal;" and (3) to formulate and sys-
tematize the conceptual apparatus for the legal order.
This selection of tasks implies, in itself, that identification and
validation are important and valuable enterprises. Perhaps a search
for the identifying marks of the theory's subject matter-in this case,
the marks of the "legal"-seems to be a neutral endeavor, common
6. Kelsen's Pure Theory is developed in GENERAL TuEORY; H. KELSEN, PURE TiHORY
OF Lw (M. Knight trans. 1967) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as Putr. Tn:oRY];
and H. KLLSEN, WmT IS JUSTIcE? (1957) [hereinafter cited without cross reference as
VH,r IS JLSTICI_].
7. Pru THEORY at 1.
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to general scientific inquiry. Yet the effort to locate what is distinctly
"legal," as opposed to "moral," reflects a judgment that the two are
and should be separable.8 When this task of identification is guided
by the desire to purify the "legal" from any "alien" elements, the
theory selects among multiple formulations of its task in a way that
has consequences for the kinds of obligations and attitudes toward
the subject matter that will emerge. By contrast, a theorist might
choose to see elements that are not strictly "legal" as essential in-
gredients that contribute to the existence of the theory's subject
matter. Different perceptions of the relation between moral and legal
obligations would emerge from this alternate perspective.
The second task, that of providing a test for legal validity, places
at the center of importance the problem of identifying the credentials
of legal authority. Instead of seeking to stress the social consequences,
the goals, or the ideal elements of a legal order, the Pure Theory
focuses on the validation of what is legal and thereby draws attention
to the formal limits of legal authority. This is a response to a felt
need for certitude and security in planning one's conduct within
the framework of a legal order.9 Singling out this task for special
emphasis has valuational implications that reflect select needs, pre-
sumably needs felt at a given time and place.
The third task of organizing a system of concepts, which operates
as the "conceptual apparatus" of the theory, may appear to be de-
tached from valuational considerations. Yet this enterprise suggests
an implicit preference for order and system. In addition, the selection
and arrangement of categories for constructing the system necessarily
result in a kind of order that bears on attitudes and conduct. If the
conceptual apparatus is systematized in terms of formal procedure
rather than content,10 or if the concept of "duty" is made prime and
"right" derivative, 1 a different valuational texture is created than
when contrasting arrangements are proposed by a theory.
8. Kelsci's effort to free the "legal" front moral elements and to ascribe only formal
procedural properties to the 'legal" is suimcd tip in his notion that "legal norms may
have any kind of content." GENERAL TtLORY at 113. Similarly, lie asserted that **a social
order that is not moral (which means: just) may nevertheless be law." PLRu TIlcORY at
63. Separating the two realms does not mean ascribing normative qualities to one and
descriptive qualities to the other; rather, law and morality each comprise logically in-
dependent normative s~stems. Weinreb, Law as Order, 91 HAPv. L. RLV. 9091, 910 (1978)
(describing Hart and Kelsen).
9. "'[Flor modern bureaucraci, the element of 'calculability of its rules' has really been
of decisive significance. lhe nature of modern civilization, especially its technical-economic
substructure, requires this 'calculability' of consequences." M. AVLIIR, ON LAW IN EcoN-
oMY AND SocIETY 350 (E. Shils & M. Rheinstein trans. 1954).
10. See pp. 8-10 infra.
11. See pp. 25-26 infia.
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Thus the selection of tasks for the theory reflects and shapes atti-
tudes towards its subject, and therein serves a political function. The
extent to which the tasks selected by the Pure Theory convey choices
that have political consequences is apparent in the criticisms of the
theory. One critic observed: "Granted its postulates, I believe the
pure theory of law to be unanswerable, but I believe also that its sub-
stance is an exercise in logic and not in life.""' Similar criticism has
challenged the undertaking of any formalistic theory like the Pure
Theory that seeks to identify legal concepts in logical arrangements
apart from moral or social considerations: "Without the examination
not only of law, but of the implications of law as a function of so-
ciety, the 'pure' essence distilled by the jurist is a colourless, tasteless,
and unnutritious food which soon evaporates."'1 Here a theorist like
Kelsen is not taken to task for failing to meet the aims he set for
himself; instead, the worthiness of those aims themselves is debated."
The tone of such criticism suggests that what is involved is something
other than an exercise in scholarly one-upmanship, in which the
theory, is criticized for having overlooked some salient fact, for con-
taining a logical inconsistency, or for not recognizing an esoteric
nuance. Because it is the core, not the details, of the theory that
is challenged, the thrust of such criticism is to raise the question of
what should have priority in theorizing-the impact of forms and
procedures, social needs and functions, the logic of formal structure,
or definitions of legal validity. At issue ultimately is the shaping
and influencing of attitudes concerning conduct under a legal order.
Even when the details of a theory are attacked, ostensibly for errors
of fact or logic or for lack of clarity, the valuational perspectives
that accompany the alleged deficiencies are often at the center of
the controversy.
I. Methodological Assumptions
Gleaned fi ,i a model of the positive sciences, Kelsen's assump-
tions concerning the nature of proof, rationality, and objectivity
serve a dual valuational function. First, these assumptions direct the
execution of the theory's central tasks and fulfill the valuations im-
12. H. LASKI, GRAMMAR OF POLITICS Vi (4th ed. 1938).
13. C. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 57 (1964).
14. See J. SuKLAR, LEGALISMi 33-34 (1964) CThe idea of treating law as a self-contained
ssstem of norms that is *there,' identifiable without any reference to the content, aim,
and development of the rules that compose it, is the very essence of formalism .... There
is . .. no particular reason to assume that [the question of validating the 'legal"] is the
only intellectually worthwhile question to be asked about law.")
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plicit in their selection. Next, as incorporated within the frame-
work of the Pure Theory, these methodological assumptions shape
and guide attitudes toward the subject of the theory, especially with
regard to the role of morality in relation to law.
At the core of Kelsen's inquiry is the problem of establishing the
validity of a legal judgment. Indeed, for Kelsen, the problem of validi-
ty is as important to normative legal theory as the problem of fac-
tual existence is to positive scientific theory. Central to both under-
takings are the criteria for establishing the truth of claims concerning
their respective subject matters. A judgment that a prescription is
legally valid is treated by Kelsen as the equivalent of a judgment
that the prescription exists as law and as truth.
A. Objective Verification
One element involved in proof of legal validity in the Pure Theory
is the requirement of objective verification. This requirement re-
flects and guides attitudes toward the legal order and toward conduct
within it by legitimating certain kinds of judgment and rejecting
others. Kelsen admits that the procedures that must be followed in
order to produce objectively verifiable judgments of legal validity
are capable of yielding only judgments about particular factual con-
texts or existing national and international orders.'5 In spite of this
basic relativism, Kelsen maintains that positive legal norms can be
verified objectively because they are
conditioned by the existence of facts. These facts are the acts by
which the legal norm is created, such as custom, a legislative, ju-
dicial, or administrative act, a legal transaction, together with
the effectiveness of the total legal order to which the legal norm
belongs.16
Because legal prescriptions may be traced to the official acts that
established them, there are procedures to verify their existence. Moral
judgments, on the other hand, can never be verified objectively,' 7
15. WHAT IS JUSTICE? at 210. 329, 361, 365.
16. Id. at 361. Kelsen also observed that legal judgments "are true or false, and their
truth or falsehood may be tested." Id. at 210.
17. Ethical philosophers would probably categorize Kelsen's anallsis of moral judg-
ments as reflecting a meta-ethical relativism in accord with emotivist theories formulated
by Ayer and Stevenson. See A. AYER. On the Analysis of Moral Judgments, in PIIILOSOPHI-
CAL EssAYs 231 (1954); C. STE rNsoN,. ETHICS AND L.,NGU.%(;E (1944). Adherents of the
emotive theory of ethics generally argue that although moral statements often are ex-
pressed in declarative form, the) actually function not to assert any trith, but rather
to express an attitude toward a state of affairs. Stevenson's formulation is: -(I) 'This
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even though it would seem that judgments of moral validity could
be objectively verified by an analogous methodological requirement
of relevant conditions creating or confirming them. Kelsen explains
that the existence and contents of underlying normative references
presupposed by a moral or a political judgment
cannot be verified by facts. [They are] determined only by the
subjective wish of the subject making the judgment. Moral and
political judgments of value and, in particular, judgments of
justice, are based on ideologies which are not, as juristic judg-
ments of value are, parallel to a definite social reality.18
The insistence on this distinction between legal and moral norms
suggests contrasting attitudes toward the legal and moral orders. A
legal judgment whose validity is objectively verifiable carries with
it an aura of respect that attaches to something that can be "proved."
In contrast, a moral judgment is a product of nothing more than
"emotional factors, and therefore, subjective in character-valid only
for the judging subject, and therefore relative only."'19
A moral judgment not only eludes objective verification; it also
cannot be established rationally. When moral judgments collide, "[i]t
is impossible to decide between [them] in a rational scientific way.
It is, in the last instance, our feeling, our will, and not our reason;
the emotional, and not the rational element of our consciousness
which decides this conflict."20 Any attempt to search for ultimate
moral principles by which competing moral claims may be proved
true or false is futile because there are no such principles to be
discovered. 21 Since, in Kelsen's view, no moral assertion can ever
is wrong' means I disapprove of this; do so as well. (2) 'He ought to do this' means
I disapsprove of his leaving this undone; do so as well. (3) 'This is good' means I ap-
Prove of this, do so as well." Id. at 21.
18. GENERAL THEORY at 49.
19. WHAT Is JusrcE? at 4.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id. at 21-22:
From the point of view of rational cognition, there are only interests of human
beings andl hence Conflicts of interest. The solution of these conflicts can be brought
albout either by ,ati'fying one interest at the expense of the other, or by a coin-
promise between the conflicting interests. It is not possible to prose that only one
or the other solution is just.
Kelen's views bear a striking resemblance to observations made by Hobbes:
whatsoever is the object of any man's Appetite or Desire, that is it, which he for
his part calleth Good; And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill; And of his
Contempt, Vile and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, Evill, and Con-
temptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being
nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be
taken fior the nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the man
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be tested or disproved by the procedures of the empirical sciences,
moral criticism can never be founded on anything more secure or
authoritative than matters of taste.
Kelsen's approach forecloses arguments that have widely been used
in deliberative discourse-arguments that are "rational" in a different
sense than that employed in the empirical sciences. Critical moral
reasoning seeks to distinguish the good and bad reasons for imposing
certain legal prescriptions on human conduct by referring to per-
vasive normative principles adhered to by a given community at a
given time. In Kelsen's view, this moral, as opposed to legal, reason-
ing is merely arbitrary.2 2 Unlike legal claims, moral claims cannot
be objectively verified.2 3 In the realm of authoritative reference points
for human conduct, morality is made to appear as a second-class citizen.
B. Proof of Legal Validity
To be legally valid according to the Pure Theory, judgments must
not only be objectively verifiable but also must pass tests for proof
of legal validity. First, the method for proving validity under Kel-
sen's model requires strict logical deduction of discrete judgments
from a single synthesizing principle. This single principle, used in
proving legal validity, must be one purified of "alien" elements such
as psychology, sociology, or ethics. To permit an "uncritical mix-
ture" of different disciplines would obscure the essence of a science





This method of proof reflects a choice from among available tech-
niques for determining validity. The requirement of one fundamental
principle as the referent for proof of legal validity precludes con-
sideration of other potential sources of validation. This methodologi-
cal stricture forecloses the possibility that the notion of legal validity
(where there is no Common-wealth) or, (in a Common-wealth) from the Person that
representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by
consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.
T. HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN 41 (American Everyman's ed. 1950) (Ist ed. London 1651).
22. WHAT IS JUSTICE? at 22.
23. Kelsen concludes that there is one moral principle that is an automatic corollary
to a relativistic philosophy of justice: "the principle of tolerance, and that means the
sympathetic understanding of the religious or political beliefs of others-without ac-
cepting them, but not preventing them from being freely expressed." Id. But if the
source of this corollary is supposed to be pure logic, Kelsen would seem to be in error.
A recognition that one's views are based on some among many possible fundamental
assumptions does not require sympathetic tolerance of those whose assumptions sharply
differ from one's own. See D. MIONRO, EN'IRIClSM AND Erics 114 (1967) ("[t]olertance does
not really follow from relativism").
24. PuRE THEORY at 1.
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might depend upon a conceptual alloy rather than a single pure
element.
Relying on strict logical entailment from one fundamental prin-
ciple as a requirement of proof is another selective choice incor-
porated into the Pure Theory. Strict logical entailment does not
exhaust the rules or procedures of rational inquiry; instead, this
methodological assumption is itself a valuational choice that rejects
other kinds of reasoning. Moral reasoning, for example, permits sup-
port by factual arguments even when there may be no link of de-
ductive logic. 25 Rational inquiry into the nature of physical things
relies on support from statements concerning sensations, not on strict
logic; judgments about character employ reasoning that derives sub-
stantiation from statements concerning behavior, even though there
is no strictly logical connection between the judgments and the state-
ments. By limiting the tests of legal validity to proof by strict logical
entailment, the Pure Theory chooses from among competing meth-
odological possibilities and frames its inquiry in such a way as to
exclude moral and other "alien" elements from its methods of proof.
Kelsen argues that this decision saves legal theory from the logical
fallacy of reductionism and guarantees it a purity and unity lacking
in other theories. Although these benefits may indeed be produced by
his formulation, his approach is selected, not compelled; other meth-
ods could also be employed to achieve the same benefits while at the
same time communicating contrasting valuations and attitudes.
Kelsen criticizes competing formulations of proof in legal theory
for reducing legality to the alien disciplines of behavioral science
and ethics. To protect against the loss of identity for the legal realm
that results from such reductionism, Kelsen admonishes against the
commission of the "is-ought fallacy": the "oughts" of legality cannot
be derived logically from behavioral fact because that would turn
the question of legal validity into a determination of causes and pre-
dictions of power. Nor may proof of legal validity be established in
reference to what the law morally ought to be, because this approach
may support a claim that the existing law is, by definition, morally
just. Kelsen's method for proving legal validity focuses on the mean-
ing of a legal obligation in any legal system-a question that limits
discussion to the objective verification of exclusively legal norms.
This formulation protects against reductionism and also ensures that
25. Hampshire, Fallacies in Moral Philosophy, 58 MIND 466 (1949) (practical de-
liberation in moral reasoning depends on wide range of matters including empirical
propositions, though conclusion not logically (lerived from them).
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what is legally valid will be free from impurities: Relevant elements
that are not identical to law are excluded from legal theorizing, and
the possible connecting links between law and behavior26 and be-
tween law and morality fall outside of the test for legal validity.
A corollary of Kelsen's method for proving legal validity is the re-
quirement of monistic unity; a theory of law should not permit the
validation of two duties that contradict one another. 27 Because it is
"the task of science to describe its object in a system of consistent
statements, that is, statements not contradicting each other,"2" Kelsen's
method of normative science requires that "two sets of valid norms
must always be parts of one single system."29 In addition to relying
on logical derivation from a single fundamental norm, the Pure
Theory achieves monistic unity by treating "ought" statements as
scientific statements of knowledge, albeit knowledge of norms, not
observable facts. By this approach, the theory ensures that the state-
ment "A ought to be done" cannot coexist with the statement "A
ought not to be done" because that would be tantamount to asserting
in a physical science both that "A is" and that "A is not." Accordingly,
it is logically impossible to consider a legal rule to be valid and at
the same time to accept as valid a moral rule that forbids the very
behavior that the legal rule prescribes. By subscribing to monistic
unity in the proof of legal validity, the Pure Theory determines that
what may appear to be a genuine conflict between the dictates of
law and the demands of morality could not logically exist.
The jurist ignores morality as a system of valid norms, just as
the moralist ignores positive law as such a system. Neither from
the one nor from the other point of view do there exist two
duties simultaneously which contradict one another. And there
is no third point of view.31
One could criticize this methodological stricture for confusing what
may be factually opposite or contrary with a logical contradiction. On
a different level, Kelsen's method has been criticized for favoring
theoretical single-mindedness at the cost of seeming to exclude "the
possibility of a moral criticism of law."3'
26. Kelsen's formulation has one exception to this exclusion of behavioral considera-
tions. This is the requirement that, as a condition for legal validity, the legal order must
be "effective." See pp. 12-13 infra.
27. See GENERAL THEORY at 374.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 376.
30. Id. at 374-75, 408-10.
31. Id. at 374.
32. H.L.A. Hart, Kelsen Visited, 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 709, 723 (1963). Kelsen's doc-
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In contrast, H.L.A. Hart observes:
An intuitively acceptable meaning for "A ought to be done" is
that "there are good reasons for doing A." If we give "ought"
this meaning then "A ought legally to be done and A ought
morally not be done" is equivalent to "There are good legal
reasons for doing A and good moral reasons for not doing A."
This expresses a conflict because it is logically impossible for one
person at the same time to do both A and not A. But it does not,
as far as I can see, assert anything contradictory or logically
impossible. 3
The effect of this interpretation is to suggest that a participant may
be bound at the same time by two conflicting, yet genuinely valid
norms, each emanating from different normative systems. The issue
thus becomes not the validity of a conflicting norm, but rather the
impossibility of complying with two conflicting valid norms at the
same time; the result is the burden of human choice.
The consequences of Hart's approach contrast sharply with those
of the Pure Theory in certain situations. Consider, for example,
one who is legally bound to go to war, and therefore to kill, but
who might feel morally bound to resist the legal prescription. Under
Kelsen's method, the moral prescription could not be simultaneously
valid. The choice here would be between a valid prescription and a
psychological feeling, not between two valid but conflicting prescrip-
tions. Kelsen would have us bound only to one normative master at
a time. Hart, in contrast, would have us bound by at least two; the
prescriptions of each, however conflicting, are recognized as bearing
the stamp of simultaneous validity. Hart thus casts the decision as a
choice between two different but equally legitimate sources of nor-
mative guidance. The existence of this alternate resolution of the
"is-ought fallacy" indicates that Kelsen's approach is only one pos-
sibility, not an inevitable one.3
4
trine of validation that is only by reference to the basic norm has been criticized as "dan-
gerous" and "silly"-"dangerous" because "it appears to invest effective coercion with dis-
proportionate value" and "silly" "because no one has ever been persuaded that the mere
presence of effective coercion is sufficient to answer all inquiries about the validity of an
order." Cowan, Law Without Force, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 683, 713 (1971).
33. H.L.A. Hart, supra note 32, at 728.
34. Monistic unity has consequences for the relation between national and interna-
tional law as well. A normative system of international law could not, under Kelsen's view,
possibly be perceived as existing side by side with a national legal order. In the interest
of monistic unity, either international law must provide the basis for the validity of
national law, or national law must assume the validating position for international law.
Sec pp. 29-30 infra.
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C. The Procedures for Validation
Incorporating Kelsen's views on objective verification, logical en-
tailment, and monistic unity, the Pure Theory proposes procedures
for resolving disputes about the bounds of legal authority. These pro-
cedures for validation introduce the valuational elements involved
in the underlying method and also shape attitudes toward both the
legal order and sources of authority.
The validating base proposed by Kelsen is the formal arrangement
of authority embodied in the First Constitution, called the Grund-
norm. Kelsen admits that there could be sources of authority beyond
the formal constitutional authority of the Grundnorm: "Certainly
one may ask why one has to respect the first constitution as a bind-
ing norm. '"3 Yet for the purposes of the Pure Theory, the Grund-
norm is presupposed to be binding as the basis for validating all
law. Presupposing the Grundnorm has the advantage of satisfying
the methodological requirement of a single synthesizing principle from
which discrete judgments can be logically deduced. In addition, the
adoption of this formal constitutional authority as the sole basis for
validation reflects Kelsen's decision to join other positivists in repu-
diating "any natural law from which positive law would receive its
validity."!,6 The Pure Theory seeks to identify that which is strictly
legal and rejects the claim of natural law that "some sort of ultimate
end, and hence some sort of definite regulation of human behavior,
proceeds from 'nature,' that is, from the nature of things or the nature
of man, from human reason or the will of God.":' 7 The adoption of the
Grundnorm as the single validating base ensures that norms not based
on formal constitutional authority can receive no validation.
The second procedural element for validation does, however, in-
troduce criteria that go beyond the formal provisions of the Grund-
norm. This is the requirement that the legal order be "effective."
In Kelsen's model, effectiveness is measured not only by the extent
to which the legal order established by the Grundnorm is actually
obeyed, but also by whether its restraints are, by and large, con-
sidered to be valid and binding by the citizenry.38 For legal pre-
scriptions to be valid, relations among individuals must be inter-
preted "as legal duties, legal rights, and legal responsibilities, and not
as mere power relations.
'3 9
In sum, a prescription is valid if it meets only two tests: (1) if it
35. GENERAL THEORY at 116.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 8.
38. WHAT IS JUSTICE? at 262.
39. Id.
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is issued pursuant to the formal requirements of authority as pre-
scribed in the Grundnorm; and (2) if the ongoing system of author-
ity works "effectively" as a whole. So long as there is evidence that
the community can survive under its legal system, these tests are
indifferent to the kind of community and to the nature of the shared
base of values sustained by the legal authority. A despotic legal order
that maintains itself by maximum force and grants minimum bene-
fits to most community members would be tested for effectiveness
exactly as would a community characterized by widespread consent
and approval. Each would be scrutinized to determine whether there
is general acquiescence to the community's structure of roles, obli-
gations, and expectations; if so, the test of effectiveness would be
passed, and other characteristics of the legal order would be irrelevant.
Thus, Kelsen's proposed tests for legal validity seem to be (a) open-
ended with respect to the kind and arrangement of authority that
would formally validate a prescription; (b) open-ended with respect
to the type of value-base to which a legal order is committed; and
(c) conditioned only on the preponderance of power sufficient to en-
sure compliance with the legal authority by persuading or subduing
those who may resist. Yet the seeming neutrality of this approach
is belied by its constant focus on one value: order.40 Order, for Kelsen,
is the prerequisite for the realization of other values by the community.
The demand for order does not itself determine whether the com-
munity will be based on private or on socialized property, nor whether
it will rest on a system of castes or on democratic ideals. Order un-
der law may be described as the neutral currency for authoritative
power because legal order is initially indifferent to the types of struc-
tures that can be purchased with it.41 Yet the primacy of order un-
der Kelsen's procedures for validation is only one of many possible
priorities for determining what is legal. One might want to require
procedural fairness as a precondition of legal validity.42 Another
formulation might insist that all legal obligations comport with sub-
stantive moral standards.
43
40. Without order, "legal order," as such, would have no meaning. According to
Kelsen, the maintenance of order is the sole function shared by all legal systems. See
p. 34 infra.
41. In this sense, the legal order may be considered "commodity-neutral," as the
term is used by Ryle: "A coin is commodity-neutral, for I can buy any sort of com-
modity with it." G. RYLE, DILEMMAS 120 (1953). Similarly, the language that is used to
describe legal arrangements is "topic-neutral." Id. at 120-21. The legal order described
by Kelsen's terminology may incorporate any of a range of social and economic structures.
42. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 97 (1964).
43. See d'Entriive, The Case for Natural Law Re-Examined, 1 NAT. L. FORUM 5, 45,
52 (1956). See also Weinreb, supra note 8, at 944 (under natural law, legal obligations
are validated "by finding in the natural order an unfolding of what must be").
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Since Kelsen's notion of legal validity looks only to the Grund-
norm and to the dominant will of those who have the power to create
and maintain an effective legal order, it is primarily a view from the
top of the community structure that relies upon submissiveness from
below. Under alternative approaches, sources such as custom, morality,
historical development, and community needs and expectations would
contribute to the authorization of valid legal prescriptions. Such
sources would guide official interpretations of the law and would
act as implicit restraints on the concept of authority itself. Under the
Pure Theory, these sources function as restraints only to the extent
that they are built into the Grundnorm itself, or to the extent that
they appear in the calculus of effective power heeded by those in
authority.
Kelsen excludes custom, morality, and community expectations from
the explicit tests for legal validity in part because he hopes to avoid
the danger of massive disobedience to law in the name of more
fundamental obligations; he also wants to shield against the danger
of moral absolutists who would employ government to impose their
preferences on others. His placement of custom and community ex-
pectations outside of the basic norm, however, is not required by
these concerns and has the effect of shaping a distinct political per-
spective on the legal order, rather than a neutral description of all
legal systems.
44
Hart's competing proposal that the "rule of recognition" rather
than the "basic norm" be employed as the ultimate formal test for
legal validity provides an alternate focus on community custom as
the source of and standard for the validating ground.45 In this respect,
Hart joins forces with Ehrlich46 and others who would urge that,
at least during the early stages of formal legal development, prior
social practice and custom should be the central points of reference
for legal validation. The very language chosen by Hart to describe
the validating principle causes a shift in attitude towards the legal
order; he proposes the expression "rule of recognition" to replace
44. The absence of any moral component from the test of validity is a consequence
of the effort to separate law and morals. This separation is just that-an effort, "not a
matter of logical classification, of conceptual clarity, of *science,' or of analytical co-
herence. It is an expression of the liberal desire to preserve individual autonomy, and to
preserve the diversity of morals which is in constant danger of ideological and govern-
mental interference." J. SHKLAR, SU1pra note 14, at 42. In this way, Kelsen's formulation
embodies and advances a particular political viewpoint, not a description with universal
application.
45. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97 (1961).
46. See E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAw (WV. Moll
trans. 1936).
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the "basic norm" partly in an effort "to avoid any commitment to
Kelsen's view of the conflict between law and morals."41 Rather
than being universal, Kelsen's formulation of the test for legal va-
lidity presumes a conflict that is not inevitable.
Hart's "rule of recognition" permits a resolution of the problem
posed by a morally repugnant law, a resolution that contrasts sharply
with Kelsen's approach to the same problem. To both Kelsen and
Hart, the "badness" of a putative law would provide no necessary
ground for declaring the law invalid, as long as the law conformed
to formal validating procedures. But Hart explicitly argues his posi-
tion as if it were a policy choice and not a matter of immutable
logic. Hart points out that to hold invalid a morally repugnant en-
actment would not be likely to lead to a stiffening resistance to evil;
similarly to hold it to be valid would not require obedience.
48
The consequence of Hart's construct is that he can defend the for-
mal validity of an allegedly bad law so long as it conforms to the
validating procedure, yet still recognize that the stamp of validity
does not ultimately require obedience. 49 In accordance with his dis-
cussion of conflicts between moral and legal "oughts," ° Hart's view
of the validating principle allows for consideration of the many pos-
sibly competing moral issues that the enforcement of a morally re-
pugnant law might bring into play.
In addition to Hart's, a third point of view provides a contrast
with Kelsen's approach to the problem of the morally bad law. This
third perspective suggests that there might be extreme situations in
which a putative law would so outrageously offend deeply held
values within a community that it would not merit even a prima
facie presumption of obedience. If Parliament were to prohibit mar-
riage or the Supreme Court were to rule Queen Elizabeth II per-
petual President of the United States,51 the rigidity of the purely
formal test of validity should give way to accommodate the unfore-
seen contingencies of the situation.
Each of these views carries different valuational tones and gen-
47. H.L.A. HART, supra note 45, at 246 nA. The rule of recognition may be enlarged
to include subsequent judicial custom as well.
48. Id. at 204-07.
49. Id. at 206. There would, however, be a prima facie obligation to obey an en-
actment unless and until overriding moral principles came into play. "No doubt if
nothing else is said, there is a presumption that one who speaks . . . of his or
others' legal obligations, does not think that there is any moral or other reason against
fulfilling them." Id. at 199.
50. See p. 11 supra.
51. See J. LUCAs, THE PRINCIPLES or POLITIcs 325 (1966) (examples of extreme cases un-
anticipated by criteria of legal validity).
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erates different political perspectives toward the legal order. Each
depends on different estimates of factual consequences and different
assumptions about the relation between instrumental means and as-
sumed ends. Furthermore, each view proceeds with different assump-
tions concerning what humans value in relation to one another and
to legal authority. This exploration is not meant to criticize any one
view; they can all be criticized for relying on the intelligent guess
and the appeal to emotion. Instead, the existence of multiple pro-
cedures for validating putative laws and legal judgments suffices to
call into question Kelsen's claims of neutrality. His approach, in
fact, contrasts sharply with other possibilities, and pours meaning
into words and concepts that, as used by others, carry different valu-
ational overtones.
III. The Meaning Ascribed to Key Terms
As was indicated earlier, the meaning one ascribes to "moral"
conveys a set of attitudes about conduct and choice within the legal
order.52 The meaning attributed to the "legal" by the Pure Theory
has similar consequences. 53 Perhaps less obvious are the complex
value choices implicit in the definitions of other terms, such as
"community" and "state," employed by the theory. These terms fall
within the family of "essentially contested concepts": 54 concepts whose
meanings are guided to some extent by diverse and competing goals
and ideals that themselves are subject to change over time. These
kinds of concepts lend themselves to rival uses and yet seldom are
susceptible to "a definite or judicial knockout."' When Kelsen uses
these terms, he selects particular meanings from a range of possible
denotations and connotations. It will become apparent that he also
relies on factual assumptions that reflect valuational choices with
political consequences.
A. Community
The political consequences of a legal theory are often apparent
in the conception of community adopted by the theory. The prob-
lem with identifying the political consequences of the concept of
52. See pp. 6-7 supra.
53. See pp. 23-25 infra.
54. See Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in THE IMPORTANCE OF LAN.GUAGE 121
(M. Black ed. 1962) (certain concepts relating to organized human activity have widely
varying uses and are so hotly contested that disclosure of multiple meanings cannot
dispel conflict).
55. Id. at 130-31.
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community employed by the Pure Theory is that, at different points,
the theory draws on significantly divergent traditions. There is some
language in Kelsen's work that would place the theory in the tradi-
tion of Aristotle, who viewed the polis as a collective unity. This
tradition identifies the community as an organic expression of the
social side of individuals whose very human nature binds them
together out of need, sympathetic concern, and respect for others.
Basic individual commitments to deeply held and commonly shared
group values give the community its own life and pattern of values
that are distinct from the lives and patterns of each individual in
the community.
In Kelsen's observations on the meaning of "community," there
are expressions that, at first blush, would seem to be in tune with
this tradition. He noted that "[a] community, in the long run, is pos-
sible only if each individual respects certain interests-life, health,
freedom, and property of everyone else, that is to say, if each re-
frains from forcibly interfering in these spheres of interest of the
others."50 Yet Kelsen's further discussion of the nature of the "collec-
tive soul, as the fact that constitutes the community of the State" shows
his ultimate disagreement with the collective view of community:
In reality, the population of a State is divided into various
interest-groups which are more or less opposed to each other.
The ideology of a collective State-interest is used to conceal this
unavoidable conflict of interests. To call that interest which is
expressed in the legal order the interest of all is a fiction even
when the legal order represents a compromise between the in-
terests of the most important groups.
57
These and other observations locate Kelsen in the second tradition
of "community." Kelsen adopts the lens of the rational egoist, per-
ceiving "community" as no more than a prudent, contrived conven-
tion to implement selfish needs and interests of individuals.
With origins in the arguments of Thrasymachus and in the theories
of Hobbes and Bentham, the starting point of this school of thought
is the individual-his needs and interests, fears and selfishness. The
individual is not innately good, but instead has aggressive urges and
drives for power and self-preservation.58 The community is not
56. GENERAL THEORY at 22; WHAT Is JUSTICE? at 238. It has been suggested that Kelsen
is expressing natural law doctrine here or is close to the theory of Interessenjurisprudenz.
See Gewirth, The Quest for Specificity in Jurisprudence, 69 ETHICS 155, 172-73 (1959).
57. GENERAL THEORY at 184-85.
58. "The illusion that it is possible to go 'back to nature' is based on the belief
that man is *by nature' good. It ignores the innate urge to aggression by man." WHAT is
JusTIC E? at 241.
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founded on benevolent or sympathetic concern for others because
there is no innate need for a social way of life. To the rational
egoist, "community" is simply a means to realize individual interests,
not an organic expression of the social side of man.59 The individual,
for prudential reasons, joins a group whose members share similar
values; community values thus consist of nothing more than the ruling
values of individuals organized into dominant groups backed by co-
ercive power. The result is usually a "compromise of conflicting in-
terests, which leaves none of them wholly satisfied."' 0 According to
Kelsen, "to say that individuals belong to a certain community, or
form a certain community, mean only that the individuals are subject
to a common order regulating their mutual behavior."'61 As a result,
the community is no more than a formal construct with no indepen-
dent existence:
the statement "individuals form a community," or "belong to a
community," is nothing but a very figurative expression of the
fact that their behavior is regulated by the legal order constituting
the community. Besides that legal order, there is no community,
no corporation, as little as there is a body of the corporation be-
sides the bodies of its members.
62
Under this view of community, the function of the legal order is
to provide a basis for effective compromise between competing groups.
Even in a community existing under a stable power structure, the
59. In the language of T6nnies, a community in the Pure Theory is a Gesellschaft-
an -imaginary and mechanical structure"-rather than a Genzeinschaft-a "real and or-
ganic life." F. T8.NIES, COMMUNITY & SocIETY 33 (C. Loomis trans. 1957).
The two views of community also can be characterized as "organic" and "contractual"
in that one presupposes natural bonds of the group that take priority over individual
interests and form the foundation for the community, while the other posits deliberate
agreements between essentially isolated individuals as the basis for the community. Each
characterization has consequences for attitudes about government and human commit-
ments under a legal order.
Those who view the community in terms of contract theory will stress the need for
consent, mutual responsibility, and mutual agreement; they will reject orders to submit
or to curtail personal freedom without receiving worthwhile benefits in exchange. As
applied to political relations, this contract approach is accompanied by democratic,
liberal, and unmystical values; similar emotional and intellectual values tend to coin-
cide with a contract view of community. See Macdonald, The Language of Political
Theory, in LoGic AND LANGUAGE 173 (A. Flew ed. 1960).
Adherence to the organic view of community would entail willing submission to and
reverence of the authority of the group. See id. at 174 (6rganic view of political re-
lations entails humble submission to authority).
60. GENERAL THEORY at 439.
61. Id. at 21.
62. Id. at 109. On this point, Kelsen's view is similar to Bentham's observation: "The
community is a fictitious body, composed of individual persons who are considered as
constituting as it were its members." J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUcTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MoRALS AND LEGISLATION 3 (Hafncr ed. 1948) (1st ed. London 1789).
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law would reflect fundamental conflict between groups and indi-
viduals by expressing the values associated with those wielding the
dominant power.63 This assumption of conflict as a basic character-
istic of community has political consequences. An adherent to this
view of community acquires a specific perception of the political or-
der as a non-utopian one of imposed constraint and continuing con-
flict. 4
The function of law and the nature of politics are very different
if the first view of community is adopted. In a community that is
seen to have its own vital existence apart from the legal order, law
"functions in the community, it is renewed and sustained by it, and
it is directed toward the end which is the community." 65 Law then
searches for and endeavors to implement those collective values that
are claimed to be above and beyond the individual interests of those
who happen to hold a preponderance of power.
Attitudes concerning the life-span of a given legal order are also
profoundly influenced by the definition of community. In Kelsen's
view, because the community is a contrived aggregation held to-
gether only by the cement of authority and power, revolution signals
a new legal order and a complete break in ties to the legal order
that preceded it. The new power base creates a new Grundnorm,
determining de novo the structure and design of the legal community.
The life of a legal order is discrete, not continuous. This perspective
carries with it the belief that the human element in shaping the
legal order is unlimited. In designing its new order, a revolutionary
group is limited only by the extent of its power.66
Other theorists perceive revolution as a new-and relatively small
-step in a continuum, rather than as a complete break with the
63. But see PuRE THEORY at 47 (Kelsen distinguishes between legal order and order
imposed by "gang of robbers," which lacks basic norm).
64. This model of society has been described using the concepts of change, conflict,
and constraint:
We do not know what an ideal society looks like-and if we think we do, we are
fortunately unable to realize our conception. Because there is no certainty (which,
by definition, is shared by everybody in that condition), there has to be constraint
to assure some livable minimum of coherence. Because we do not know all the
answers, there has to be continuous conflict over values and policies. Because of
uncertainty, there is always change and development. Quite apart from its merits
as a tool of scientific analysis, the conflict model is essentially non-utopian; it is
the model of an open society.
R. DAHRENDORF, Out of Utolpia, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF SOCIETY 128 (1968).
65. Cairns, The Community as the Legal Order, in COMMUNITY 29 (NOMOS If C.
Friedrich ed. 1959). This is the core of Ehrlich's view that the key to an understanding
of law is the community. See E. EHRLICH, supra note 46, at 39-82.
66. See GLNERAL THEORY at 11 n.* (natural law used as powerful but merely ideo-
logical instrument by revolutionaries).
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past. For Olivecrona, "a revolution implies a partial altering of the
law in an unconstitutional way. The legal system as a whole sur-
vives." 67 For Userson, revolution represents a "hurtling together of
the positive and natural laws."08
Indeed these competing understandings of the life-span of the legal
order are off-shoots of the larger controversy over natural law. Those
who have a sense of the continuum in legal order focus on the dis-
coverable patterns of human expectations or the intrinsic ideals em-
bedded in the social order. Those who deny the persistence of laws
innate in man or in nature find in the willful acts of individuals
great potential power to bring about abrupt, dramatic change. Thus,
through its definition of community, a legal theory such as Kelsen's
communicates a collection of attitudes about human conflict, social
order, revolution, and conduct under law.
B. The State
According to traditional formulations, a comprehensive social or-
der includes the state, a political subsystem of which the legal system
is only one part. Such a view contemplates the possibility of gov-
ernment without law and also recognizes a separate status for non-
political groupings such as private associations." The legal order is
dependent upon and subservient to the state.
Kelsen rejects this formulation as "ideological." His claim is that
conceptual separation of the state and the legal order conceals the
unavoidable conflict of individual and group interests in the name
of the collective interest of the state and encourages an illusion
that the subsystem called the state is independent of the actual or
potential control of the legal order. The only justification for the
definitional separation is that "people will better fulfill their duties
to the State if they are induced to believe the theory."
70
Endeavoring to view the state "free of ideology," Kelsen puts forth
the view that the state is simply the legal order, although he notes
that not all legal orders are states.71 The justification for obedience
67. K. OLIVECRONA, LAW As FACt 71 (2d ed. 1971).
68. McBride, The Essential Role of Models and Analogies in the Philosophy of Law,
43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 53, 69 (1968) (citing Ldserson, Revolution und Recht, 8 ZEITSCHRIFr
FUR OFFENLICHES RECHT 557 (1929).
69. See Raz, The Identity of Legal Systems, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 813 (1971) (criti-
cizing Kelsen for neglecting interaction between political and nonpolitical subsystems of
comprehensive social system).
70. GENERAL THEORY at 186.
71. Pure THEORY at 286. Primitive societies and the international legal order are not
states; to be a state, a legal order must be centralized. Id.
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to the legal order is Hobbesian prudence accompanied by the threat
of preponderant power. There is no independent reason to obey the
state because, according to Kelsen, the state has no separate existence
or ability to demand obedience. In the event of conflict between
normative demands, the legal order ultimately overrides all other
demands, including those of the state. To conceive of the state dif-
ferently is to accept a fictional entity created and sustained only by
tradition.
Support for this view is not drawn from sociology or other ma-
terials descriptive of human experience. Despite his claim that he
is revealing truth hidden by tradition, Kelsen is merely asking the
reader to make a value judgment concerning the state that is differ-
ent from the traditional view.
C. Factual Assumptions
Sustaining the meanings ascribed to key terms within the Pure
Theory are factual assumptions about human nature. Kelsen's view
of community as a collection of self-interested individuals reflects a
basic belief in "the innate urge to aggression in maii' and funda-
mental assumptions about conflicts between groups. 7 2 Identifying the
state as another name for centralized legal orders in part depends
on a view that monopolized, authoritative coercion is a prerequisite
of order in human society. As will be developed later,73 Kelsen also
assumes that punishment, not reward, is the superior means of social
control and that beneficence is unlikely to effectuate a social order.
7 4
Relying on assertions rather than evidence, Kelsen assumes that co-
ercion always plays the paramount role in securing order within a
legal community.
Although these views are presented as if they were a matter of
common knowledge, they involve factual issues that have generated
serious scientific controversy for some time. That Kelsen's factual
assumptions lack empirical rigor might be damning enough to his
claim to have constructed a universal, value-free theory. Even more
damaging, however, are the valuational implications inherent in his
assumed facts. Factual assumptions are often thought to be immune
from valuational implications, but this conclusion is an unwarranted
deduction from the truism that facts and values are logically distinct
categories. The truism itself does not rule out the presence of sig-
72. WHAT IS JUSTICE? at 241.
73. See p. 27 infra.
74. E.g., WHAT IS JUSTICE? at 234, 241-44.
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nificant relationships between the two categories. Thus, Hobbes's
recommendation that absolute sovereignty be chosen as the method
for achieving order rests on his assumptions about the nature of the
human animal. In contrast, programs for social reform commonly
draw upon assumptions of human plasticity.
The structure emerging from Kelsen's assumptions about human
nature resembles the Hobbesian state where there is no concern for
the common good but instead an emphasis on protecting the interests
of individuals or groups who vie with each other in a competitive
struggle. Perhaps such a structure would instill fear of the legal
order; perhaps it would induce passivity. As one author noted,
What could be more welcome to people who are frightened and
feel impotent to change the course leading to destruction than a
theory that assures us that violence stems from our animal nature,
from an ungovernable drive for aggression, and that the best that
we can do, as Lorenz asserts, is to understand the law of evo-
lution that accounts for the power of this drive? This theory of
an innate aggressiveness easily becomes an ideology that helps to
soothe the fear of what is to happen and to rationalize the sense
of impotence.
7 5
Whether a sense of impotence, fear, or some other response would
emerge under the structure designed by the Pure Theory, these at-
titudes are inextricably connected to the factual assumptions built
into key definitions used in the theory. The valuational overtones
of these assumptions thus are pervasive and indeed fundamental to
the theory itself.
IV. The Conceptual Apparatus
The conceptual apparatus determines the relationship between ba-
sic components of the Pure Theory and prescribes how the legal order
should operate. No less than the meanings ascribed to key terms,
the conceptual apparatus incorporates factual assumptions and choices
of meaning that have valuational consequences. The prime concept
is that of legal obligation; integral conceptual arrangements govern
the relationship between duty and right, sanction and delict, and
public and private law. A separate set of concepts that contain a
microcosm of the entire theory comprises the Pure Theory's approach
to international law.
75. E. FROMM, THE ANATOMY OF HUMAN DESTRUCTIVENESS 2 (1973).
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A. Legal Obligation
Conceptual patterns within the Pure Theory rest on the notion
of legal obligation. To seek an answer to the question of the meaning
of the "legal" is, in Kelsen's view, not to probe for psychological
or sociological data, or to predict patterns of judicial behavior, but
rather to ascertain what certain conduct under a legal order ought
to be. This "ought" has a peculiarly legal normative quality that
emanates from obligatory commitment to a system of legitimate legal
authority.
Under Kelsen's theory, a logical distinction is maintained between
(1) whether one has a legal obligation and (2) whether, having one,
one ought to act in compliance with it. "That somebody is legally
obligated to certain conduct means that an [official] organ 'ought'
to apply a sanction to him in case of contrary conduct."76 The legal
"ought," unlike the moral "ought," is not addressed directly to the
subject as a standard of behavior to which the subject should conform.
What is "binding" about the legal "ought," accordingly, is the co-
erciveness of externally imposed authoritative sanctions, not its inher-
ent worth and not the subject's own conviction. From the subject's
viewpoint, the legally obligatory "ought" could, without loss of mean-
ing, be readily translated into the indicative mode. An example
would be: "If you fail to conduct yourself in a certain way, then
you will suffer an authorized sanction." This is, in effect, Holmes's
"bad man" view of the law.7 7 To have a legal obligation, it is thus
not necessary that it be binding in the sense of moral obligation that
the feeling of compulsion is internal and volitional; nor is it a con-
dition for having a legal obligation that it be instrumental or con-
tributory to the "good life."
The valuational perspective that this view generates may be seen
when it is contrasted with the expectations that ordinarily accompany
the notion of moral obligation. It would seem strange even to suggest
a logical distinction between (I) having a moral obligation and (2)
the issue of whether, having one, one ought to act in compliance
with it. Having a moral obligation carries with it, as part of its very
76. GENERAL THEORY at 60. For a discussion of the connection between Kelsen's
formulation of legal obligation and Kantian and neo-Kantian thought, see Ebenstein,
The Pure Theory of Law: Demythologizing Legal Thought, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 617, 628
(1971).
77. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897), reprinted
in COLLECrED LErGAL PAPERS 167, 173 (1921) ("But what does [the notion of legal duty]
mean to a bad man? Mainly, and in the first place, a prophecy that if he does certain
things he will be subjected to disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or
compulsory payment of money.")
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meaning, a prima facie presumption that one ought to act accordingly,
because built into it is the notion that fulfilling the obligation is
instrumental to what is right and good. Absent overriding considera-
tions introduced by other moral values, the presumption ought to
prevail; not to accord it prima facie status would be a moral "wrong."
By separating the existence of a legal obligation from the question
of whether one ought to do what the obligation prescribes, Kelsen
suggests that legal obligation be viewed as heteronomous, as nothing
more than something externally imposed on the subjects of an ex-
isting legal order. Legal obligation, unlike moral obligation, is thus
denied any prima facie notion of "wrongness" for failure to comply.
It derives its power not from any moral considerations but by virtue
of the fact that it flows from the basic rule conferring enforcement
powers on those in positions of authority. In essence, there is no
substantive difference between being obliged to comply with a gun-
man's order and being legally obligated to perform acts that are
morally unjust. The difference between the two is primarily pro-
cedural. Under Kelsen's theory, the "legal" is authorized, and thus
legitimate; the gunman's order is not.
Hart's view of legal obligation is somewhat similar. According
to Hart,
Not only may vast numbers [of those who do not voluntarily ac-
cept the legal order itself] be coerced by laws which they do not
regard as morally binding, but it is not even true that those who
do accept the system voluntarily, must conceive of themselves as
morally bound to do so, though the system will be more stable
when they do so.J s
The political function of this Kelsen-Hart position is underscored
by those who offer practical reasons for supporting it and also by
those who offer competing formulations that invite different attitudes
about legal obligation. For example, it has been suggested that if
legal obligation is viewed as carrying with it a prima facie duty to
comply, this would give an unwarranted advantage to those who
impose the obligatory prescriptions. This would place on the indi-
vidual the burden of defending his decision not to obey, instead of
placing on the authorities the burden of "making their decrees worthy
of being obeyed. ' 79 An alternate formulation rests on a prima facie
duty to obey the obligatory prescriptions of a legal order, which
78. H.L.A. HART, supra note 45, at 198.
79. Ladd, Legal and Moral Obligation, in POLITICAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATION 35-36
(NOMOS XII J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1970).
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follows logically from the belief that almost any society is preferable
to none.80 The latter perspective regards legal obligation as a species
of moral obligation only in the sense that, since any legal order is
preferable to anarchy, there exists prima facie justification for obedi-
ence. These different perspectives clearly suggest that there are com-
peting valuations at work here and the Pure Theory selects only one
possible perspective on legal obligation.
B. Right and Duty
Different perspectives, attitudes, and outlooks are generated by the
alternate arrangements of rights and duties within a legal theory.8'
More than a linguistic convention by which one term can be readily
translated into another, the arrangement of right and duty may place
duty as prime with right derivative, or the roles of the two concepts
may be reversed. A rights-oriented theory stresses human aims, goals,
and aspirations. Its central concern is the individual, and it implies a
primary political concern for individual interests even when there is
a cost in terms of social utility. A duty-oriented theory directs atten-
tion to the demands of the legal order; individual benefits flow only
indirectly from this order. The connotation of duty is one of restraint
rather than aspiration. A conceptual arrangement resting on duty
deflects the view that there are basic rights that preexist the legal order
and that the legal order may support but does not actually create., '
In the Pure Theory, the concept of duty is central and right is
derivative. A right claimed by an individual is nothing more than
a technique provided by the legal order; it does not precede the legal
order. Thus, there is no right not to be robbed or killed, since the
execution of the sanction is dependent upon action by a legal in-
stitution. The injured party or his relatives have no claim or right
80. See K. BALER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW 235-39, 309 (it is better to construct
society than to live without rules because morality possible only in society); T. HOBES,
supra note 21, at 142-44 (it is better to give all power to one sovereign than to remain
in state of nature).
81. Conceptual emphasis on one of two related concepts is not indigenous to legal
theory. In ethical theory, some formulations give the central position to "good" and a
derivatie place to "right"; others use the reverse approach. See A. EDEL, METHOD IN
ETHIC.AL THEORY 35 (1963). Similarly, the subordination of right and duty to value has
been the thrust of utilitarian formulations since Bentham. See G. MYRDAL, THE Po-
LITIcAL ELEMENT IN TIlE DEVELOPMENT OF EcONONtIc THEORY 56 (1954).
82. Similarly, the arrangement of other concepts communicates a set of attitudes:
[R]educing "right" to "good" often carries the view that the rules of right are merely
generalized methods of achieving the good in an unstable world. Reducing "good"
to "right" may mean directing men's energies away from the apparent goods of
unsophisticated men toward an eternal set of objects of striving.
A. EDEL, supra note 81, at 31-35.
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to initiate official sanctions against the perpetrator. There is, in con-
trast, a right to sue for breach of contract; execution of a sanction
depends "not only upon the fact that a contract has been made and that
one party has failed to fulfill it, but also upon the other party's express-
ing a will that the sanction be executed against the delinquent."'
Because right is derivative of duty, "[n]o legal right is conceivable
without any corresponding duty, but there could well exist a legal
duty without a corresponding legal right. '8 4
To structure the concepts in another way would be to acknowledge
the existence of rights apart from those created by the state. These
might be rights that existed before the state itself arose. To Kelsen,
a theory that permits rights to exist before the legal order undermines
the authority of a legal order and thus fails to describe legal systems
that exist.
If the legal order cannot create but [can] merely guarantee rights,
it cannot abolish existing rights either. It is then legally impos-
sible to abolish the institution of private property, nay, legislation
is then incapable of depriving any particular individual of any
particular proprietary right of his. All these consequences of the
doctrine of the priority of rights are in contradiction to legal
reality. The doctrine of the priority of rights is not a scientific
description of positive law but a political ideology.1 -
But if the doctrine that gives priority to rights expresses a political
ideology, so does the doctrine that stresses duty; the difference is only
in the content of the values, not in the presence or absence of such
valuational elements. Priority placed on rights elevates the individual
above the community and justifies resistance to the legal order if it
impinges on individual rights. Priority placed on duty reflects an
overriding concern for the demands of the society as a whole and
denies the validity of individual notions that violate the legal order.,,
The conceptual arrangement described by the Pure Theory imple-
ments a set of political values that shape views of human choice and
potential within society; it does not arrange a legal theory purified
of valuations.
83. GENERAL THEORY at 82. The right to sue for breach of contract derives from
the legal order, not prior norms.
84. Id. at 85.
85. Id. at 80.
86. See D. RITCHIE, NATURAL RIGHTS 101-02 (2d ed. 1903) ("The person with rights
and duties is the product of a society, and the rights of the individual must therefore
be judged from the point of view of a society as a whole, and not the society from
the point of view of the individual.")
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C. The Concepts of "Delict" and "Sanction"
The Pure Theory was intended to employ a conceptual apparatus
that would avoid the abuses of natural law theorists and prevent
the appeal to human experiences beyond the legal order as a defense
to legal culpability.8 7 In the name of purifying the concept of "delict,"
Kelsen strips it of moralistic stigma and imbues it with his notions
of legal obligation and duty. Accordingly, legal culpability is incurred
as a price to be paid for membership in a legal community. It is
simply the result of the limitations on individual freedoms that nec-
essarily inhere in any legal system.
In this vein, the Pure Theory places primacy on the coercive sanc-
tion rather than on long- or short-ranged normative appeals based on
the substantive content of a particular legal norm. A community mem-
ber who breaches a legal norm triggers the fundamental obligation
of those in authority to impose a sanction. The prescriptiveness of
the norm lies fundamentally in this requirement of imposing the
sanction, not in the "good" or "duty" that inheres in the subject-
matter of the norm itself.88
Professedly a structural account that describes all legal orders, Kel-
sen's formulation claims to purify legal culpability of any notion of
moral wrongdoing, and to stress the coercive element as central to
legal control. Yet the coercive element of the "legal" has not always
nor does it everywhere play a central role. Indeed, where it has pre-
vailed, it may reflect a period of strife or a time of considerable in-
ternal social conflict; it may signal a pathological rather than a nor-
mal condition of community life. Kelsen's notions of delict and sanc-
tion, rooted in assumptions about human nature, function to separate
legal wrongdoing from moral considerations, and in so doing, gen-
erate a particular valuational perspective toward the legal order.
D. "Public" and "Private" Law
Kelsen claims that the traditional distinction between private legal
transactions and regulation by public authorities has an ideological
character that must be rejected by a pure legal theory.s9 In particular,
87. Kelsen fears that giving primacy to the substantive content of laws would en-
courage appeal to natural law, which he suspects "may and has been abused for po-
litical purposes in a manner not always consistent with progress or justice." Lauterpacht,
Kelsen's Pure Science of Law, in MODERN THEORIEs OF L.%w 136 (W. Jennings ed. 1933).
88. Kelsen suggests that a conditional statement exhaustively describes this notion:
"'If a certain behavior is present, then a certain sanction ought to be executed.'"
PURE THEORY at 113.
89. Id. at 281.
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two consequences of this dualism lead to ideological contamination:
(1) the view that government and its administrative machinery are
above the law or free from law;90 and (2) the view that "political
dominion is restricted to public law, that is, primarily to constitu-
tional and administrative law, but entirely excluded from private
law."91
To purify legal theory, Kelsen breaks down the traditional dualism
by underscoring the common characteristics of private and public
law. He identifies both private legal transactions and regulation by
public authorities as different expressions of delegated legal authority.
The focus on the common function of delegated law subjects gov-
ernment and its machinery to the control of the basic norm of the
legal order; similarly, "the 'private' right created by the legal trans-
action of the contract is just as much the theater of the political
dominion as the public law created by legislation and administra-
tion."' 92 Both public and private law, under this conceptual approach,
emanate from the single source of the basic norm. Both the prescrip-
tions of government and the arrangement of private transactions are
creations of the single overarching authority of the legal order.
This facially neutral principle of "the unity of the normative or-
der" 93 in fact produces consequences with a distinct political content
and ideological cast. Under this formulation, freedom to negotiate
private contractual relationships is no longer an act of two free wills
outside the realm of legal authority. Instead, it is a delegation of
lawmaking by the legal authority to its designated agents. What were
private rights become political rights, created by the legal order. In
addition, because public authority is unified with private law, it is
not above the legal order and not free from the coercive power of
the law. Unlike the sovereign in Austin's theory, public authority is
subject to the restraints and obligations imposed by the basic norm
of the legal order. Because it introduces these changes in the tradi-
tional conceptual arrangement, the Pure Theory represents one ide-
ology in deadly competition with the one that is attacked.
90. Id. at 283.
91. Id. Note Kelsen's comment: "The political character of private rights becomes
still more obvious as soon as one realizes that the conferring of private rights upon indi-
viduals is the specific legal technique of civil law, and that civil law is the specific
legal technique of private capitalism, which is at the same time a political system."
GENERAL THEORY at 89.
92. PuRE THEORY at 283.
93. GENERAL THEORY at 110-11.
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E. International Law
In constructing a distinct conceptual framework for international
law, the Pure Theory manifests some of the same valuational ele-
ments that permeate the rest of the Theory and introduces some
additional ideological elements as well.9 4 One of the methodological
assumptions that is important to Kelsen's construction of a theory of
international law is that a theory of law must "present its object as
a unity."' 5 This assumption requires a basic norm by which both
national and international law must be validated. Logically, inter-
national law itself could serve as the basic norm and provide the
validating base for all national legal orders, or alternatively, interna-
tional law could owe its own validity to each of the respective na-
tional legal orders. The first view would accord ultimate authority
to international law; the second, to national law. Logic, according
to Kelsen, is indifferent to either model, for either could provide
the basis for a complete, systematic, and unified account of legal
validity for all law.
For the Pure Theory, Kelsen chooses primacy for international
law because, from an aesthetic view, its monism is simpler and neater
than the more disjointed and cumbersome pluralistic conception.9"
From this viewpoint, "the international obligations and rights of the
States are exactly the same whether the one or the other of the two
hypotheses is assumed." 97 From a political point of view, however,
Kelsen admits that the difference is important:
A person whose political attitude is one of nationalism and im-
perialism will naturally be inclined to accept the hypothesis of
the primacy of national law. A person whose sympathies are for
internationalism and pacifism will be inclined to accept the hy-
pothesis of the primacy of international law. From the point of
view of the science of law, it is irrelevant which hypothesis one
chooses. But from the point of view of political ideology, the
choice is important since tied up with the idea of sovereignty. 98
A supranational foundation for international law carries with it the
valuational overtones of a worldly outlook on human problems, a
94. Indeed, the very use of the label "international law" is not devoid of an impact
on attitudes. H. KA.rNoRowicz, THE DEFINITION OF LAW 10 (A. Campbell ed. 1958) (ex-
istence of civilization would become more precarious if other name were substituted
for international law).
95. PURE THEORY at 328.
96. "Both systems are equally correct and equally justified. It is impossible to decide
between them on the basis of the science of law." PURE THEORY at 345-46.
97. GENERAL THEORY at 387.
98. Id. at 388; see PURE THEORY at 346.
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broadly shared conception of expectations and responsibilities, and
perhaps a universal kind of human restraint and aspiration. This model
also suggests an enveloping "legal community" to which nation states
look as the source of ultimate authority for validating their legal ex-
istence and for accounting for their behavior. Once it is given the
ultimate legitimate power to determine when a national legal system
expires and when a new legal system earns entry into the world com-
munity, the supranational world order acquires the aura of the highest,
independent authority.99 Valuational overtones of some sort are un-
avoidable according to Kelsen's approach because of his demand for
unifying the authority behind the national and international realms. 100
Because Kelsen uses the international legal order as the validating
base, he elevates the importance of commitment to a supranational
community.
Professor Hart offers a contrasting resolution of the issue of unified
authority; his approach suggests an entirely different political per-
spective on international law. According to Hart:
[O]nce we emancipate ourselves from the assumption that in-
ternational law must contain a basic rule, the question to be
faced is one of fact. What is the actual character of the rules
as they function in the relations between states? Different inter-
pretations of the phenomena to be observed are of course pos-
sible; but it is submitted that there is no basic rule providing
general criteria of validity for the rules of international law,
and that the rules which are in fact operative constitute not a
system but a set of rules, among which are the rules providing for
the binding force of treaties.1°1
Hart suggests that international law be regarded as a body of law
for a community that is not advanced enough to enjoy the luxury
of a general criterion of validity, such as a Grundnorm or rule of
recognition. The binding force of the community would be found
simply in the fact that its rules are actually accepted and observed
as standards of obligatory conduct. No ultimate rule, no unitary sys-
tem is required to demonstrate the validity or binding force of par-
ticular rules of international law. Indeed, notes Hart, no basic rule
99. See L. COHEN, THE PRINCIPLES OF WORLD CITIZENSHIP 87 (1954) (law of interna-
tional community overrides loyalty to individual states; supreme allegiance owed to most
widely administered legal system).
100. Kelsen thus asserts an "epistemological postulate: to understand all law in one
system-that is, from one and the same standpoint-as one closed whole" is necessary
for human cognition of law. PURE THEORY at 328.
101. H.L.A. HART, supra note 45, at 230.31.
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now serves as a test for the validity of individual rules of interna-
tional law yet nations carry on their relations with one another.
Hart proposes a pluralistic construct as the theory of international
law. Accordingly, international law emanates not from a central au-
thority but centripetally from the nation states to common mooring
points. The rules for establishing common mooring points develop
pragmatically and are crystallized in practice; they obtain their bind-
ing force much as the rules of a game come to bind those that play
it. A nation state that wittingly uses the procedures specified by the
rules of the game-procedures, for example, that transform words into
treaties 02-are thereby deemed "bound" by what the procedures en-
tail. Through participation in a game, there is an implicit acceptance
of the general rules and an obligation to abide by the specific con-
sequences of the particular "moves" or "plays." If Kelsen's formu-
lation were to be characterized by a game model, his players would
be confined to one game, the rules of which are the product of the
international legal order and its tests for legal validity. Hart's players
instead are engaged in a series of games played according to rules
that are developed and sustained by customary practices of the nation
states themselves.
The political function of Kelsen's approach is brought to the fore
by the points of contrast between it and Hart's conception. A dif-
ferent attitude towards the hierarchy of authority and the sources of
binding rules is conveyed by each; different views of the legitimacy
of common usage and custom are also apparent. Kelsen's approach
may have been developed for aesthetic reasons or to satisfy a particular
methodological concern for unity, but its effect is to implement only
one from among competing conceptions of an international legal order.
V. Role Assignments Under the Pure Theory
The designation of those who are to play major and minor roles
under the theory, and the leeway that accompanies the major roles
assigned, project images of a legal order with valuational overtones
for those who are the actors within it.
A. Selection of Persons Addressed
Who is addressed by the Pure Theory? Legal obligation is charac-
terized not as a prescription of a certain type of conduct addressed
102. Id. at 228 (international law in the "usual terminology of international lawyers
[is] a set of customary rules of which the rule giving binding force to treaties is onc").
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directly to members of the community; rather it is merely an indirect
result of the requirement that officials impose coercive measures if
conditions in violation of the law should arise. The direct address
is only to the officials of the legal order. Kelsen explains:
Legal obligation is not, or not immediately, the behavior that
ought to be. Only the coercive act, functioning as a sanction,
ought to be. If we say: "He who is legally obligated to a certain
behavior, 'ought' to behave in this way according to the law,"
we only express the idea that a coercive act as a sanction ought
to be executed if he does not behave in this way.103
This conception can be stated formally: If A (delict) is, B (sanc-
tion) ought to be. The "is" part of this formulation is perceived
simply as a factual condition for an obligation on the part of the
authorities to impose a coercive sanction.104 Thus it is the authorities
who are given the central role under the theory. Those who are on
the receiving end of the law and subject to its sanctions are viewed
merely as subsidiary, supporting characters. Moreover, those in au-
thority are not confined to controlling willed or negligent human
action for which responsibility may be ascribed. Indeed, the coercive
"ought" may be triggered by circumstances that individuals cannot
control, such as race, nationality, or contagious disease.
Cast in the language of criminal law and trespass, the Pure Theory
emphasizes threats and deprivations, not incentives and rewards. A
similar formulation could employ a different tone: the subjects could
be placed in a direct personal relationship with the sovereign who
commands awe as well as imposes sanctions. Legal obligation under
the Pure Theory, however, appears as an impersonal result of the
power of officials to impose sanctions. The image projected is an
authoritarian model of a legal order that demands submission by
community members. Officials receive the sense of absolute power
to impose sanctions where necessary and to interpret the law where
necessary.
B. Interpretation by Officials
Officials have the responsibility to impose sanctions whenever cir-
cumstances arise in violation of the law. But what should an official
103. PuRE THEORY at 119 (citation omitted).
104. This formulation prompted the following observation: "We cannot, according
to Kelsen, speak of the citizen obeying or disobeying the law. For the latter contains
not orders to the individual citizen but only declarations to its officials as to what con-
sequences follow certain acts. The law is thus not a command by any natural person
or group to other human beings, but only a self-contained system of propositions."
M. COHEN, REASON AND LAW 80 (1950).
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do in the face of a law that is intentionally or unintentionally inde-
terminate? Kelsen joins other theorists in concluding that an indeter-
minate law leaves the law-applier several possibilities from which to
choose and no single one of them is exclusively correct. 103 Subject
to much dispute, however, is the extent to which the law-applying
organ is free to fill in the gaps or instead is restricted by general
rules or requirements for interpretation. Hart urges that officials act
as would a scorer in applying a rule in a competitive game; although
the indeterminate rule permits flexible judgments the rule "has a
core of settled meaning."'106 If there are frequent official aberrations
from the core of settled meaning, either the players no longer accept
the rulings or the game has changed to one based on the scorer's dis-
cretion.107 Another approach finds judges bound to the "overriding
principle that good reasons for judicial decision must be public stan-
dards rather than private prejudice."108 Alternatively, restraints on
official discretion may stem from precedents or customs.10 9
It would not be hard to find support for each of these positions
in the experiences of various legal orders. Kelsen adopts another view
that may also be supported in practice, but certainly does not describe
universal experience. Like the realists who claim that it is self-de-
ceptive to believe that official discretion is circumscribed by any
standards guiding interpretation, Kelsen asserts that the official is
unfettered in applying indeterminate laws. The legal official called
upon to establish a legal act has free discretion "unless the positive
law itself delegates some meta-legal norms like morals or justice; but
then these norms are transformed into norms of the positive law."" 0
Kelsen's view communicates an attitude of broad latitude to legal
authorities, limited only by the extent to which officials can maintain
an effective legal order. Officials could even permit moral and other
"alien" considerations to enter via their interpretations of the law.
Unlike those who would tether official discretion to something be-
105. PURE THEORY at 353.
106. H.L.A. HART, supra note 45, at 140.
107. Id. at 141.
108. Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PHIL. 624, 635 (1963).
109. Raz, Legal PrinciPles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 853 (1972). There
is a related tug-of-war over the meaning and limits of "authority" in political theory.
See Peters & Winch, Authority, in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 83 (A. Quinton ed. 1967).
Peters notes that "once it is granted that [the authority] occupies an office or holds a
status legitimately, and once it is made clear that he is not straying from its sphere
of competence or exceeding his prerogative, there can be no further question of jus-
tifying his commands." Id. at 95. Winch argues that "we have to deal with genuine
authority, as opposed to bare power or ability to influence, only where he who de-
cidies does so under the idea of what he conceives to be the right decision." Id. at 105.
110. PuRE THEORY at 353-54.
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yond itself, Kelsen's approach accords expansive power to officials,
and it is a power unchecked by the principles held within the com-
munity or the legal authorities' own precedents. These role assign-
ments under the Pure Theory and the valuational tone that accom-
panies them are neither inevitable nor universal.
VI. Assumptions Concerning the Functions of a Legal Order
Legal theories have vied with each other in proclaiming the basic
function or goal that a legal order, by its very nature, must serve.
The result is not a consensus but a variety of competing notions
that generate different attitudes towards the legal order and implicitly
carry with them different standards for implementing and evaluating
it. Some theories assert that the basic value or function of law is to
promote "good human activity, or more briefly, the good life";11'
"to perform an essentially utilitarian function"; 112 to "[o]pen up,
maintain and preserve the channels of communication by which men
convey to one another what they perceive, feel, and desire";" 3 to
pursue "the modest aim of survival";"14 to assist as society struggles
to achieve democratic ideals;" 5 and to adjust conflicting human claims
through social engineering. 10
Although Kelsen considers the notion of "collective security" as
the basic function of a legal order and suggests that "the aim of col-
lective security is peace, because peace is the absence of the use of
physical force," he nevertheless concludes that "[a]ll one can say is
that the development of the law runs in this direction."" 17 By re-
jecting any particular function as essential to the legal order, Kelsen
apparently assures that the Pure Theory will be value-neutral and
have universal application. Yet what would this notion mean for one
who lives in a legal system molded along the lines of the Pure Theory?
It means that a particular value preference is expressed in the theory
-a preference that permits systems of law to develop even if they
do not aim to promote the good life, to implement democratic ideals,
or to further some other quality deemed important if not crucial by
111. F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 17 (1933) (citation omitted).
112. R. WNASSERSTRO., Tue JUDICIAL DECISION 10 (1961) (citation omitted).
113. L. FULLER, sutla note 12, at 186.
114. H.L.A. H.RT, supra note 45, at 187.
115. See Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy, 52 YALE L.J. 203,
205 (1943).
116. See R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 163-64 (1923); J. STONE, HUMAN
LAW AND HUMAN JusrICE 266-75 (1965) (commentary on Pound's theory).
117. PURE THEORY at 37-38.
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other theories of law. Permitting the coercive nature of a legal order
to cloak what some may call oppression or tyranny is not a neutral
stance but a particular choice about which there is continuing de-
bate.""s
VII. Looking at Legal Theory
A legal theory may be attired in the language of science to em-
phasize its empirical dimensions. It may employ logic to clarify its
conceptual apparatus; it may use linguistic analysis to locate experi-
ences incorporated in common language usage. In these and other
ways, legal theory may hide from view its political function-the ex-
tent to which it is shaped, consciously or not, by political values, and,
in turn, itself shapes attitudes and conduct under a legal order.
The political function of the Pure Theory is not readily apparent
because of Kelsen's own approach to legal theory. Kelsen has fashioned
a special pair of lenses through which the detached observer is in-
vited to see what purport to be the structural elements and frame-
work of any legal order. The picture received by this observer is
distorted, however, because the viewing lenses are so constructed as
to block from vision one of the theory's essential structural com-
ponents-the valuational element. The distortion might well elude
this observer if he is trained as a scientist to consider primarily the
procedures for obtaining reliable facts about nature, rather than to
identify the values that accompany commitment to the norms of a
legal order.
To correct the distortion, it was necessary in the foregoing analysis
to adopt a viewing lens fashioned for a critical participant in the legal
order, i.e., one to whom the legal order is directly and not vicariously
applicable, one who is alert to the constant need to assess the impact
of the legal order on the community, and one for whom legal theory
is less a matter for detached contemplation than a mechanism to assist
human adaptation to the environment. Although both the detached
observer and the critical participant are interested in the knowledge
conveyed by a theory, the critical participant is concerned less with
the theory's claims to logic and clarity than with the more directly
felt human values that the theory would implement if adopted and
acted upon. The function of legal theory, from the vantage point of
the critical participant, is not to describe or explain the happenings
of a legal order in the manner of a scientific theory; nor is its pur-
118. Kelsen's emphasis on the minimal order to be assured by the legal system is
also a .-aluation. See p. 13 supra.
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pose to use a kind of linguistic analysis to delineate the ways in which
legal concepts actually are employed. Instead, the critical participant
understands a legal theory to identify commitments demanded by the
legal order and to provide guidance and invite action in application
of those commitments.
Thus, one approach in this analysis has been to ask, at each point
of entry to the Pure Theory, what the consequences of this theory
are for one's attitudes about commitment to and conduct under the
legal order, and what other approaches might be both possible and
preferable. Much as a theory of music may be seen by one who plays
a musical instrument as a guide to proper understanding of the in-
strument for the purpose of playing it, the Pure Theory is perceived
by the critical participant as a mechanism for guiding conduct and
for directing attitudes within a framework of actual or potential hu-
man commitment to a legal order. From this perspective, it is appar-
ent that despite its claims to be free of valuations, the Pure Theory
reflects political values in its selection of tasks, in the meanings as-
cribed to its key terms, in its factual assumptions, conceptual ap-
paratus, procedures for validation, in its role assignments, and in its
assumptions concerning the functions of a legal order.
In addition to these specific valuations, the Pure Theory reflects
and promotes a particular political response to the social context that
prevailed when it was constructed. Kelsen's Grundnorm may be seen
as a response to the need for a political shift from the notion of the
personal ruler who is above the law to the constitutional authority
that circumscribes and impersonalizes legitimate power in society. The
theory's emphasis on validation addresses the need of the modern
nation-state to secure what Weber called "legitimations of domina-
tion":" 9 the use of traditional, legal, and charismatic justifications
for demanding respect for the state's monopoly of authorized coercion.
As a paradigm of legal formalism, the Pure Theory has been linked
with ideas that "have come into vogue with the rise of absolute gov-
ernment throughout the world and [that] give the autocrat the aid
and comfort of scientific theory."' 2 0 It is no accident that the theory
projects a particular image of legal authority.
The weakness of the Pure Theory is not that it occasionally vio-
lates its own method and purpose but that it 'attempts, in the name
of method and purpose, to insulate its normative base from its en-
119. Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FRom MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78 (H.
Gerth & C. Mills eds. 1946).
120. R. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAIW 28 (1942).
Vol. 88: 1, 1978
Political Element in Legal Theory
vironment and thereby shut from view the values and choices built
into the theory. If the operative political values were systematically
expressed and justified, an enhanced understanding and more respon-
sive evaluation of the theory would be possible. Unsubstantiated
claims that appear in the background of the theory would be subject
to scrutiny; factual assumptions and valuational judgments would
be available for assessment. For example, doubts about Kelsen's as-
sumptions of innate human aggression and the effectiveness of co-
ercive power could be brought to bear on the theory; similarly,
the theory could be tested in light of contemporary challenges to
vertical authority as the sole mode of distributing power. Absent
explicit expression and justification of these fundamental elements
of the theory, the theory cannot be fully understood nor appropriately
prepared for evaluation. Its political values can be weighed more
readily if they are brought to the surface and made accessible to
observation. Rather than perceiving these elements as contaminants or
irrelevant side issues, it would seem more fruitful to recognize the
valuations as essential to the theory's construction and evaluation.
Open expression and justification of the value preferences inherent
in this legal theory would permit the critic to evaluate, not just ex-
pose, the theory's internal inconsistencies.
121
This analysis was undertaken as a case study. At this juncture, the
pervasive presence of valuational elements in this extreme and un-
compromisingly positivist theory suggests that any formal legal theory
would also contain valuations affecting commitments, attitudes, and
conduct under the proposed legal order. Evaluation of other legal
theories would be helped if they were viewed as if they were recom-
mendations for legislative policy. Such a perspective would force to
the forefront the political values sought by each theory; it would
inspire rigorous argument and critical scrutiny of the empirical claims
and value judgments grounding each theory's structure and method.
In this way, a meaningful joinder of issue between theorist and critic
might be possible. Currently, such a joinder is woefully lacking in
much of the literature in legal theory.
In the style of a legislative debate, the ultimate argument for
accepting a legal theory should not be that it is irrefutable. That
121. Compare Gunnar Myrdal's discussion of guidelines for social analysis:
Value premises should be introduced openly. They should be explicitly stated and
not kept hidden as tacit assumptions. They should be used not only as premises for
our policy conclusions but also to determine the direction of our positive research.
They should thus be kept conscious and in the focus of attention throughout the
work . ...
G. MYRDAL, VALUE IN SOCIAL THEORY 52 (1958).
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claim, common to scientific theory, is inappropriate for a normative
theory. Instead, the argument for a legal theory should be that it
would serve as a better conduit for preferred human values. In con-
tentions over rival theories, as in political debate, differences in
values or in the weights accorded to values would be at work even
where there may be agreement on facts. An occasional demonstration
of illogic or refutation of a factual assumption may persuade one
against the adoption of a theory, but decisive knockouts of this sort
would probably be achieved only rarely. Even when competing theories
seem to turn on meanings ascribed to key terms, such as community,
morality, and obligation, it is a comparison of values that yields ac-
ceptance or rejection. If debates of legal theory took this form, the
result would be not unlike the process of judicial decisionmaking. A
dissenting opinion is rarely considered wrong in the sense that it
has been refuted by logic or through facts; 122 it is the minority view
because the values that it expresses are not, at a given time, dominantly
preferred. It could well become the dominant opinion at a different
time and place if it acquires a new trajectory and force in a climate
of changed values.
If legal theories would aim at expressing the values that they im-
plicitly carry with them, they would be seen less as formal constructs
and more as proposals for human action to be adopted now or in
the future. A legal theory, regardless of claims about positivist pas-
sivity, carries with it potentially active valuational elements that
should be brought into the open. A direct route to this goal would
be a new resolve to view such positivist legal theories as proposals
for human action, to borrow the spectacles of the critical participant,
and to adopt the procedures of practical reasoning in the process of
their construction and evaluation.
123
122. Involved here is a presumption that a case can be made out for both sides,
even if one side is clearly superior to the other. See Ladd, Practical Reason in Judicial
Decision, in RATIONAL DECISION 136 (NOMOS VII C. Friedrich ed. 1967) (judicial de-
cisions involve confutation, or "[o]verturning a practical syllogism by overriding a premise
though a case can be made out for the premise"; scientific judgments involve refutation,
or "overturning by attacking the premises" as untrue).
123. D. GAUTHIER, PRACTICAL REASONING 2, 9-23 (1963) (account of procedures for prac-
tical reasoning; relating standards of judgment to solutions of actual problems).
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